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Abstract 
 
Do political variables influence long-term environmental transitions? The 
discussion on the determinants of the environmental performance of countries 
has been dominated by a focus on the Environmental Kuznets curve. This 
concept concentrated primarily on the role of economic factors, in particular 
per capita income levels. By contrast, we outline both conceptually and 
empirically how political factors can affect long-term carbon trajectories. Our 
findings from an error-correction model suggest that political factors are an 
important explanatory variable for carbon emissions in over 100 countries 
during the period 1970-2004.  The results show that political capacity reduces 
carbon emission in OECD countries whereas political constraints, democracy 
and the Kyoto Protocol reduce long-term carbon emission in the group of all 
countries as well as in non-OECD countries. 
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1. Political or Economic Determinants? 
 
Can countries successfully achieve long-term environmental transitions, in 
terms of fundamental rather than marginal change (Sprinz forthcoming)? The 
concept of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) suggests that comparatively 
high levels of economic development enable such transitions.  By contrast, we 
argue that benign environmental trajectories depend on a range of political 
factors such the political capacity of governments, democracy, as well as the 
political constraints placed on policy change. 
 
In the mid-1990s, the literature in economics suggested that environmental 
conditions across countries depend on per capita income levels.  In particular, 
an inverted-U shaped trajectory for the relationship between per capita income 
and per capita emission was suggested.  The perhaps clearest description of 
the argument is offered by Dasgupta et al. (see Figure 1): 
In the first stage of industrialization, pollution in the environmental 
Kuznets curve world grows rapidly because people are more interested in 
jobs and income than clean air and water, communities are too poor to 
pay for abatement, and environmental regulation is correspondingly 
weak. The balance shifts as income rises. Leading industrial sectors 
become cleaner, people value the environment more highly, and 
regulatory institutions become more effective. Along the curve, pollution 
levels off in the middle-income range and then falls toward pre-industrial 
levels in wealthy societies (Dasgupta et al. 2002, 147). 
 
Assuming some learning or technological diffusion, relative latecomers may 
purse a somewhat more benign pollution path. 
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Figure 1: Stylized Environmental Kuznets Curve 
 
 
Source: Hayward 2005 
 
The empirical debate about the existence of an inverted U-shaped relationship 
did not lead to clear results, hinting at initial model misspecification. Countries 
may follow quite different trajectories even at comparable levels of economic 
development, and the trajectories may also vary by pollutant. 
 
Given the current discussion about the long-term effects of climate change 
which are likely to involve considerable non-reversible impacts, the question 
arises whether a transition to a low-carbon economy can be achieved 
(European Environment Agency 2005).  If such a goal is desirable, it would be 
important to learn whether political factors can make such an outcome more 
likely.  While we cannot easily predict what the future will bring, we can assess 
whether political factors help us to explain past pollution trajectories.  The 
answer to this question is of relevance to both academia and policymakers.  
Earlier studies tended to omit political factors in the explanation of pollution 
trajectories.  By including such variables, we explore the enduring effect of 
politics on pollution trajectories. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the debate on the EKC 
whereas Section 3 highlights the relevant political determinants of long-term 
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environmental transitions.  In Section 4, we present our results of the political 
and economic determinants of carbon trajectories.  The final section concludes 
with a brief outlook on the research ahead of us. 
 
 
2. The Environmental Kuznets Curve 
 
The question of the influence of levels of economic development on 
environmental conditions across countries achieved prominence on the 
scientific agenda in the context of the development of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and associated concerns about its environmental 
impact. Arguing that further economic growth would help Mexico improve its 
environmental record, Grossman and Krueger (1995) claimed that NAFTA 
would be environmentally beneficial. They based this argument on their 
statistical finding of an inverted U-shaped relationship between levels of 
economic development and environmental degradation.  
 
Grossman and Krueger’s findings stood in stark contrast to traditional 
concerns about the impact of economic growth on environmental performance, 
e.g. the findings of the Club of Rome in the 1970s. Typically, these approaches 
had conceived environmental degradation to uniformly increase with growth, at 
least until overuse of environmental resources leads to negative feedbacks. 
Furthermore, Grossman and Krueger’s findings were politically convenient as 
they implied that countries could simply “grow” out of their environmental 
problems.  
 
Two decades of research on the relationship between levels of economic 
development and environmental performance, however, reveal that a range of 
possible relationships exists: linearly increasing or decreasing trends, inverted 
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U-shaped trajectories, as well as N-shaped relationships.1 Moreover, scholars 
have shown findings to be highly dependent on the environmental indicators 
and control variables chosen, as well as the data and statistical methods 
employed (Fuchs 2003; Lempert et al. forthcoming; Stern 2004). Overall, the 
existence of the EKC has become highly controversial.  
 
More comprehensive explanations of the relationship between per capita 
income levels and environmental quality are largely missing. As Fuchs (2003) 
has shown there is no one to one relationship between changes in par capita 
income levels and environmental quality, as other factors strongly influence 
environmental quality at a given level of economic development. At the same 
time, there is no scientific consensus on the political (and economic) factors 
that ought to be included in econometric models besides per capita income 
levels (Dasgupta et al. 2002; Yandle et al. 2004).   
 
With respect to the specific focus on carbon emissions, the situation is similar. 
The existence of an EKC is controversial and comprehensive analyses of the 
determinants of the carbon trajectories of countries are missing. There is only a 
slight majority of studies supporting the hypothesis of an inverted U-shaped 
trajectory for carbon dioxide, in particular for OECD countries (Galeotti et al. 
May 2006; Martínez-Zarzoso et al. 2007). In fact, a bivariate plot of the 
trajectories of select large carbon emitters reveals considerable variation 
between countries (see Figure 2). At the same time, most studies only analyze 
the impact of per capita income on emissions and fail to pay sufficient 
attention to political variables (Galeotti et al. May 2006; Huanga et al. 2008; 
Roberts and Grimes 1997). In consequence, substantial ambiguity over the 
influence of the political characteristics of countries and time effects caused by 
specific political events, for example, remains.  
 
                                       
1
 An N-shaped relationship indicates a relinking of economic growth and environmental pollution at higher income levels 
and was found by De Bruyn and Opschoor 1997, for instance. 
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Figure 2: Per Capita Carbon Trajectories (1960-2004) (selected countries) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: see Appendix. 
 
One would expect politics to have an influence on the environmental 
performance of a country, however, irrespective of its level of economic 
development. After all, reducing environmental degradation requires the 
overcoming of collective action failures, which in turn depends on political will 
and capacity. Dasgupta’s quote in the introduction is revealing: both the 
willingness of people to have a cleaner environment and the efficiency of 
regulations and institutions are political issues. In consequence, the influence 
of political factors on carbon emissions at any given level of development needs 
to be investigated. 
 
In conclusion, scholars tend to agree that per capita income levels have a 
substantial impact on environmental degradation in general, and carbon 
emissions, in particular. The functional form of the relationship is highly 
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controversial, however, and the predominance of an EKC more than ever in 
doubt. Our research hints at a possible reason for this: the influence of 
political factors, which is as yet unclear and requires urgent inquiry.  
 
 
3. Political Factors 
 
In this paper, we aim to highlight the role national and international politics 
plays in determining long-term carbon trajectories. On the side of national 
political characteristics, we consider three factors: a) the political capacity of 
governments, b) political constraints, and c) the level of democracy. These three 
factors occupy a prominent place in scholarship on country performance with 
respect to different policy issues, in general, and environmental policy, in 
particular.2 As we argue below, they are also important factors for our inquiry 
on the cross-national and cross-temporal determinants of environmental 
trajectories. On the side of international political developments, we consider 
two major stages of global climate change governance: a) the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) and b) the Kyoto Protocol. Both treaties 
have dominated the agenda of global climate change politics and a country’s 
signature status should signal its attention to the issue of carbon emissions. 
 
First, some scholars have suggested that the political capacity of a government 
provides a powerful explanation of political outcomes (Organski and Kugler 
1980; Arbetman and Kugler 1997). They based this claim on the observation 
that some governments perform better in achieving a given political objective 
than others, irrespective of the institutional structure in which they act. In this 
vein, Jänicke and Mönch (1988) argue that the ability of a political system to 
react to problems and its capacity to pursue goals in a coordinated manner 
                                       
2
 e.g. Arbetman and Kugler 1997; Feng 2005; Fuchs 2003; Henisz and Zelner 2006; Henisz 
et al. 2005; Midlarsky 1998; Knill et al. 2008. 
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over long periods of time is likely to be a crucial determinant of environmental 
outcomes.  
 
But how can one capture the political capacity of governments? Organski and 
Kugler (1980) and later Arbetman and Kugler (1997) have argued that it is 
reflected in the ability of governments to extract resources from their 
population, which signals the extent to which a government is popularly 
endorsed or accepted (see also Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2007): 
 
Governments all require resources in order to enact policies.  Taxation 
represents willingness on the part of the population (or enforcement ability 
on the part of the government) to transfer resources from private 
individuals to the government.  This resource transfer is the bridge 
between politics and money; taxation demonstrates an endorsement or at 
least acceptance of a government by the population. …  A measure based 
on extractive capabilities of a government allows for an assessment of the 
efficiency and performance of a government (in relation to its expected 
performance) that does not reflect resource allocation and is not tied to 
institutional design (Arbetman-Rabinowitz and Johnson 2007, 4). 
 
Accordingly, they operationalize relative political capacity in terms of the actual 
ability of governments to extract resources relative to their estimated potential 
for extraction (controlling for factors that are not in the hands of governments, 
such as resource endowments). Efficient governments are expected to make full 
use of their extractive capabilities, while inefficient governments are expected 
to fall short on this. The indicator has been applied to a variety of research 
contexts, including economic outcomes, such as inflation and investment, and 
political outcomes, such as war and internal political violence (Arbetman-
Rabinowitz and Johnson 2007). 
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In the context of our research question, we expect the political capacity of 
governments to allow them to pursue environmental policy objectives with 
greater effectiveness. Likewise, we imagine highly capable governments to be 
better able to create the institutional and material infrastructures supporting 
the energy efficiency of their economy. Similarly, “capable” states will be better 
at enforcing property rights and limiting negative externalities, i.e. at reducing 
collective action problems and forcing individuals and firms to internalise the 
costs of pollution. In the period we are considering, this situation is more likely 
to have existed for OECD countries than for developing countries. The former 
had to pay attention to environmental issues since the 1960s and 1970s, due 
to rising environmental movements as well as the arrival of environmental 
politics on the global agenda in the context of the Stockholm conference in 
1972. In contrast, economic growth dominated the political agenda for 
developing countries, especially as an image of a trade-off between economic 
and environmental objectives prevailed in this era. This leads us to hypothesize 
that higher political capacity is negatively related to environmental 
degradation, in particular in OECD countries. 
 
Second, scholars have suggested that trust in the probability of policy reversal 
will have an effect on economic and political outcomes in situations in which 
substantial investments by actors are needed. Specifically, Henisz (2000) has 
argued that business actors are more likely to invest in telecommunications or 
energy related infrastructure in countries in which the risk of a reversal of 
liberalization and deregulation policies inviting such investments is low.  This 
situation applies in our context as well. The potential of substantial reductions 
in per capita carbon emissions ultimately rests on substantial changes in 
production and/or consumption processes and structures in a country. Who 
will invest in such changes in the absence of trust in the stability of the 
underlying policies? 
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In order to assess the risk of policy reversals, Henisz (2000) has developed an 
indicator of political constraints. This indicator measures the feasibility of 
policy change given the number of veto points and the preference alignment of 
the relevant actors in a political system. Henisz aims to improve on previous 
measures of political risk, which failed to comprehensively consider both the 
institutional set-up and the potential for preference heterogeneity between the 
political actors with veto power. In operational terms, Henisz’ political 
constraints index uses a spatial model of political interaction which yields a 
score ranging from zero (unconstrained) to one (most constrained) for a given 
political system.  
 
In the context of our research question, the presence of veto players (i.e., 
higher level of political constraints) prevents the development of policies that 
involve large negative externalities. The more actors have to be satisfied by any 
decision, the less likely that projects with negative externalities would be 
launched.  
 
Third, comparative studies of the determinants of environmental policy have 
focused on the role of the institutional structure of a political system in 
explaining cross-national differences in environmental quality. Scholars 
especially have considered the impact of regime type on environmental policy 
output and outcome (Payne 1995; Buell and DeLuca 1996; Midlarsky 1998; 
Press 1994; Williams and Matheny 1995). The direction of the influence of this 
factor is quite controversial, however. Some authors claim that democracies are 
incapable of solving major environmental problems, as the liberty awarded to 
self-interested individuals to pursue their personal gain may lead to negative 
externalities and engender collective action problems (Hardin 1968; Heilbroner 
1975; Ophuls 1977). Other authors suggest that democracies are superior in 
solving environmental problems because of the higher degree of long-term 
legitimacy awarded to environmental policies, superior information flows, and – 
 12
where existing - a higher responsiveness to public demands for a clean 
environment (Press 1994; Passmore 1974; Payne 1995; Ward 2008).  
 
We find this second perspective more convincing.  In the context of our 
research question, we expect a greater degree of transparency in political, 
economic, and environmental activities, a higher level of public acceptance of 
environmental policies, and a greater responsiveness to public demands to 
facilitate the reduction of carbon emissions.  We operationalize the level of 
democracy in a country by using the democracy index included in the Polity IV 
dataset by Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr. Like the previous versions, the current 
version Polity IV contains a composite indicator of levels of democracy in a 
given country combining characteristics such as the competitiveness and 
openness of executive recruitment, and the regulation and competitiveness of 
participation. Based on the above argument, we hypothesize that higher levels 
of democracy will lead to lower emissions. 
 
Until now, we have only considered the influence of domestic political 
characteristics on a country’s carbon trajectory. International politics, however, 
is likely to exert an influence as well, especially in the era of globalization and 
global governance. Global climate change politics, in particular, deserves 
attention here. The development of the FCCC in the context of the Rio summit 
and the Kyoto Protocol thereafter signalled that carbon emissions had arrived 
on the agenda of global environmental governance. The FCCC contained little 
concrete demands on its members, and the Kyoto Protocol only did so for 
OECD countries, of course. Moreover, these treaties have only been signed 
recently. Still, the agenda-setting effect of these treaties should not be 
underestimated. By signalling government commitment to domestic lawmakers, 
investors, and other countries, facilitating information exchange, and fostering 
technological cooperation, for instance these treaties are likely to be linked to a 
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reduction in carbon emissions in all member countries.3  In consequence, we 
hypothesize that countries which have signed the treaties will have lower 
emissions.4 
 
 
4. Data Analysis & Discussion 
 
We chose per capita carbon emissions as the dependent variable as it is a 
necessary condition for a transition to a low-carbon economy in the context of 
economic growth.  It also plays an important role in terms of fairness 
considerations in the discussion on how to limit global GHG emissions. 
 
For the purposes of our research, we have created a dataset from reputable 
sources which are listed in the Appendix.  The political variables were made 
available by the developers of the particular indices, and the economic 
variables were derived from the Penn World Tables.  The dependent variable, 
carbon emissions, has been extracted from the World Resource Institute’s CAIT 
6.0 database. 
 
Our dataset comprises nearly all countries with proper statistical services over 
the time span 1960-2004, yet the service sector variable constrains us to the 
period 1970-2004.  As countries have very divergent patterns of data 
availability and in view of our interest in long-term emissions, we restrict the 
analysis to countries with at least 20 years of complete observations.  The 
analyses presented below refer to a total of 109 countries – omitting many 
economies in transition for reason of lacking sufficient data series.  Of the 
countries included in the analysis, 23 countries are OECD members during the 
period under investigation, and 12 are OPEC countries. 
                                       
3
 See also the extensive literature on the effectiveness of international (environmental) regimes (e.g. Bernauer 1995; Downs et al. 
1996; Hovi et al. 2003; Keohane et al. 1993; Mitchell 2002, Mitchell 2006; Stokke and Vidas 1996; Young 2001). 
4
 Alternatively, one could have chosen ratification. However, we understand international treaties to have initially a signalling 
effect on both domestic lawmakers (who will write bills in their national assembly) and foreign countries, as well as on 
private investors. This effect can largely be captured by the signature of the treaty, rather than the ratification.  
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The political variables included in the analysis comprise domestic properties of 
political systems and the signature status of climate-relevant international 
treaties.  More specifically, the three domestic political variables comprise 
relative political capacity, political constraints, and democracy (see previous 
section).  Furthermore, the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol have been created 
with the goal to limit GHG emissions. 
 
Besides the political variables, we controlled for a range of economic variables.  
These include per capita income – the cornerstone of the EKC discussion – as 
well as international trade and a few other economic control variables (see 
below). 
 
Exploratory analysis of the times-series cross-sectional data pointed to strong 
error autocorrelation and substantial heteroskedasticity.  Our estimation 
employs panel-corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995; Beck 2001).  As 
comparatively small countries, which also often happened to be oil-producing 
countries, caused substantial outlier problems, we weighted countries by the 
natural logarithm of their population, and included OPEC membership status 
and interactions with related variables to account for their specific situation. 
All variables are summarized in Table 1. 
 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate an Error Correction Model (ECM). Two 
reasons support our decision. First, early diagnosis tests indicated that some of 
our variables might cointegrate. Using traditional OLS or related regression 
techniques might then lead to spurious relationships. The ECM allows 
overcoming this issue. 
 
Second, we are interested in both the short- and long-run relationships 
between our core variables and our dependent variable. The study of long-run 
trajectories requires to understand what influences per-capita carbon 
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emissions in the present and in the more distant future. For this purpose, an 
ECM is the ideal tool to estimate both type of effects.  
 
Technically, the functional form of an ECM is: 
tititititi XXYY ,,31,21,10, ... εββββ ++∆+++=∆ −−  
 
where the direct, short-term, effects are captured by the coefficient of the first 
difference of the independent variables, while the long-term effects are assessed 
through the lagged independent variables (Franzese 2002).  Importantly, this 
analysis estimates the first difference of per capita carbon emissions, not the 
level of these emissions, which is what our study is focused on (see Table 2).  
Hence, in order to understand the effects of our independent variables on the 
per capita level of carbon emissions in Table 2 (below), one needs to divide the 
coefficient βn by -β1 (i.e., the inverse of the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable). The transformations for a selection of independent variables are 
presented in Table 3. Notice that it is a simple linear transformation, and both 
the signs and the significance levels remain identical to those in Table 2. 
 
The empirical analyses are presented below in Tables 2 (in differences) and 
Table 3 (in levels).  Model (1) includes all countries; Models (2) and (3) look at 
two large subsets of all countries.  Model (2) limits the observations to OECD 
members and Model (3) to non-OECD (i.e., developing) countries.  Model (4) 
focuses on OPEC countries only.  The rationale is to better discriminate among 
the very heterogeneous set of non-OECD states.5  As the political constraints 
and democracy variables are highly correlated, we alternated their inclusion in 
each of the four analyses, with the (a) results including political constraints 
and (b) results incorporating the level of democracy respectively.  Overall, the 
explanatory power of our model is limited for the group of all countries and 
increases to 10-19% for specific country groups.   
 
                                       
5 Obviously, variables that were region specific in Model (1) are dropped in models (2), (3), and (4).  
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Our original research question was whether political variables have persistent 
effects on emission trajectories – while accounting for economic variables.  The 
answer is affirmative.  For the purposes of ease of exposition, we will 
concentrate our discussion on the results in levels as listed in Table 3. 
 
Let us first turn to the domestic political variables.  Relative political capacity 
nearly always has a carbon-reducing impact.  Only for the cases of the OECD 
countries does it have a very pronounced and statistically significant effect: ½ 
unit of increase in relative political capacity leads to emission reductions of 
about 3.75 t CO2 per capita.6   
 
We alternated the inclusion of political constraint and democracy due to their 
high correlation.  Again, each of these variables had normally an emission-
reducing effect.  Specifically, a 1/10 increase in political constraint leads to an 
decrease of emissions by .22 tons for non-OECD countries and a reduction of 
.52 tons of CO2 for all countries.  These results are, however, difficult to 
interpret substantively as the measure is used continuously across time and 
space.  Perhaps there are different lock-in effects during the upwardly sloping 
part of the per capita emissions curve as compared to the downwardly sloping 
part of the same curve.  The current results only report an average, and future 
research may be directed to elucidate whether two different types of political 
veto or lock-in effects may exist: a program for economic growth during the 
earlier stages of economic development vs. a program for environmental 
protection later on. 
 
Democracies do indeed generate lower levels of per capita carbon emissions, 
ranging from a reduction of .07 t for non-OECD countries to a reduction of .18 
t of per capita CO2 for all countries on a 21-point scale.  Since political systems 
                                       
6
 This is a very substantial effect, yet should be seen in the context of the development of the measure: it is the relative extraction 
ratio as compared to other countries.  For one country to improve, others have to lessen their political capacity (c.p.).  The 
development of measures of absolute political capacity will remedy this caveat. 
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have changed their democracy values over the past half century markedly, the 
emission-reducing effect of democratic transitions cannot be underestimated. 
 
We notice that the effect of democratic levels is only significant in non-OECD 
countries. One explanation for this is that is possible that there is a democratic 
threshold: once a country reaches a certain level of democratization, the effect 
of additional ‘democracy’ loses its effect. In other words, once a country 
becomes an established democracy, it does not matter in terms of carbon 
emissions whether it marginally improves its democratic institutions. 
 
In addition to the domestic political variables, we focused on the effect of 
international climate treaties on the emission trajectory of countries.  Given 
that the two climate treaties could only have effects towards the end of our time 
series, we originally expected mild, yet emission-reducing, effects.  While the 
UNFCCC generally has no effect – except for a statistically significant 
emissions-increasing (!) effect in OPEC countries – the Kyoto Protocol witnessed 
clear emission-reducing effects.  In particular, in the group of all countries, 
signature status reduced emissions by around 3 tons of per capita CO2, and in 
non-OECD countries, these reductions amount to around 2.5 tons.  For OECD 
countries, there was no statistically significant effect of the Kyoto Protocol, 
although the coefficients are negative and smaller as compared to the other 
groups.7  This would imply that those countries that politically insist most 
vividly on furthering hard law emission reduction target do not yet generate 
relative emission reductions due to international policies – whereas those 
countries which have taken over mostly informational obligations actually 
reduce relative emissions (c.p.).  While we have presented our results in terms 
of partial derivatives, this result may constitute a puzzle.  Perhaps treaty effects 
mask other factors which we have not yet included in our analysis or perhaps 
we have arrived at a paradox. 
 
                                       
7
 As OPEC countries did not sign the Kyoto Protocol, they were excluded from this analysis. 
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Regarding the economic variables, the immediate effect of an increase of per 
capita income on CO2 emissions per capita is positive (captured by GDP per 
capita growth in absolute terms) as expected. This is the case in all models, 
although the effect is substantially stronger in industrialized countries, where 
an increase of a hundred dollars in income between two periods leads to 2.5 
tons in additional CO2 emissions per capita. 
 
The long term effects of income are more interesting: while they are positive on 
aggregate and in the developing countries, they are negative in OECD member 
states – albeit insignificantly so.  Thus, ceteris paribus, an additional $100 
leads more than 100 additional kilograms of CO2 per capita in developing 
countries, whereas there is no significant long-term impact of income in 
industrialized countries. For industrialized countries, we may be at the verge of 
declining relative carbon emissions as the economy grows.  
 
The second major set of economic variables is trade-related, as we consider the 
impact of trade openness (imports plus exports as a ratio of GDP).  Again, we 
differentiate between the long and the short-term effects of an increase of the 
independent variable.  The short-term impact of trade openness (changes in 
trade openness between two years) is uniformly positive and significant (except 
in Model 4b with OPEC countries), although stronger in OECD countries. That 
is, short-term effects of globalization in trade always increase per-capita CO2 
emissions.  This is not surprising in so far that trade is a vector of growth in 
economic activity. 
 
More interesting are the long-run effects: Scholars have often questioned 
whether trade favors a ‘pollution heaven’ effect, that is, a shift of ‘dirty’ 
production to poorer countries.  In fact, we find that the long term effects are 
generally not significant and close to zero, except in OPEC countries. In the 
latter countries, trade openness in the long run tends to decrease per capita 
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carbon emissions: a percentage point increase in trade openness results in a 
decrease of .2 tons of CO2 per capita.  
 
Further, our results show that there are neither short-term nor long-term 
emission-reducing effects due to the transformation of economies from the 
primary and secondary sectors to a service economy – with the exception of 
OPEC countries, where short-term increases in the share of the service sector 
leads to higher emissions. 
 
Finally, the price of oil has no immediate impact on per-capita carbon 
emissions, possibly due to the impossibility to adapt a country’s emissions to 
short term changes in fuel prices. However, oil prices have a long run effect in 
both OECD and OPEC countries. In the former, higher oil prices tend to lead to 
a decrease in carbon emissions, which seems to indicate that industrialized 
economies adapt to shifts in fuel prices. On the other hand – and not 
surprisingly – OPEC countries see their carbon emissions respond positively to 
oil price increases. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The results of our exploratory analysis are striking: Political variables already 
display pronounced effects on past per capita carbon trajectories.  This could 
also be interpreted as grounds for cautious optimism as political factors can be 
helpful in the transition to a low-greenhouse gas future. 
 
In future analyses, we ideally would like to lengthen the time horizon to the 
period following WW II, include the economies in transition which have been 
omitted due to interrupted GDP time series, and use our generic research 
design in the context of other environmental issues.  Furthermore, we would 
like to learn why some countries select themselves into different pollution 
trajectories than other countries. 
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Table 1: Description of Variables 
 
Variable N Mean  Std.Dev. Min Max 
CO2 per 
cap. 5045 3.606244 5.877655 0 55.5 
      
Political 
Capacity 5106 0.9660341 0.4758995 0.01 7.4 
      
Political 
Constraint 4715 0.31547 0.3340533 0 0.8935905 
      
Democracy 
Level 5706 0.7928496 7.623378 -10 10 
      
FCCC 
Signature 6549 0.2667583 0.4422987 0 1 
      
Kyoto 
Signature 6549 0.0067186 0.0816974 0 1 
      
GDP per 
Capita (K$) 5293 6.89451 8.038442 0.17055 84.69463 
      
Trade 
Openness 5293 62.13518 50.34635 3.38 986.45 
      
Service 
Sector 4032 0.6680311 0.1419842 0.0422223 0.9856503 
      
Oil Price 
($2007)  6438 30.96315 21.67004 9.651194 93.07938 
      
OPEC*Trade 
Openness  5293 5.741217 21.95882 0 188.62 
      
OPEC 6549 0.0761948 0.2653299 0 1 
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Table 2:  Analysis of Carbon Emissions (1970-2004) – 
Differences 
 
Dependent variable:  
∆ CO2 per capita 
(1a)   
All countries 
(1b)  
All countries 
(2a) 
 OECD 
countries 
(2b)  
OECD 
countries 
Political Capacity (t-1) -0.010 -0.020 -0.089** -0.089** 
 (0.029) (0.0237) (0.0423) (0.0413) 
     
Political Constraint  (t-1) -0.189***  0.066  
 (0.0647)  (0.0996)  
     
Democracy Level (t-1)  -0.007***  0.002 
  (0.00191)  (0.00352) 
     
FCCC Signature (t-1) -0.038 -0.037 -0.033 -0.037 
 (0.0269) (0.0239) (0.0628) (0.0656) 
     
Kyoto Signature (t-1) -0.104** -0.118*** -0.012 -0.008 
 (0.0479) (0.0416) (0.0706) (0.0811) 
     
GDP per Capita (t-1) (K$) 0.0326*** 0.0327*** -0.0079 -0.00734 
 (0.00861) (0.00761) (0.00589) (0.00546) 
     
∆ GDP per Capita (K$) 0.127** 0.0878** 0.295*** 0.295*** 
 (0.0536) (0.0445) (0.0511) (0.0525) 
     
Trade Openness (t-1) 0.0000381 0.00000893 -0.000772 -0.000731 
 (0.000222) (0.000275) (0.000679) (0.000671) 
     
∆ Trade Openness 0.00693*** 0.00238*** 0.0188** 0.0191** 
 (0.00179) (0.000682) (0.00749) (0.00765) 
     
Service  (t-1) -0.0265 -0.0362 0.415 0.393 
 (0.0967) (0.0986) (0.316) (0.305) 
     
∆ Service 0.433 0.600** 3.859 3.755 
 (0.318) (0.286) (2.38) (2.364) 
     
Oil Price (t-1) -0.000478 -0.000523 -0.00392*** -0.00392*** 
 (0.000808) (0.00072) (0.00136) (0.00144) 
     
∆ Oil Price -0.000158 0.000424 -0.000931 -0.00096 
 (0.00127) (0.00112) (0.00216) (0.00229) 
     
OPEC * Trade Openness (t-
1) 
0.00175 0.0011 n.a n.a. 
 (0.00171) (0.00153)   
     
OPEC (t-1) 0.0655 0.073 n.a. n.a. 
 (0.0714) (0.0674)   
     
CO2 per Capita (t-1) -0.0364*** -0.0382*** -0.0118** -0.0111* 
 (0.011) (0.01) (0.00543) (0.00585) 
     
Constant 0.0223 -0.00365 0.0815 0.111 
  (0.0704) (0.0637) (0.215) 0.193) 
Observations 3558 3583 778 782 
R2 0.071 0.062 0.159 0.159 
OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) (in parenthesis). * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Dependent variable:  
∆ CO2 per capita 
(3a) Non-OECD (3b) Non-OECD (4a) OPEC (4b) OPEC 
Political Capacity  0.005 -0.005 -0.019 -0.057 
(t-1) (0.0335) (0.0278) (0.189) (0.175) 
     
Political Constraint   -0.119*  -0.212  
(t-1) (0.0625)  (0.296)  
     
Democracy Level   -0.004***  -0.015* 
(t-1)  (0.00126)  (0.00763) 
     
FCCC Signature  0.007 0.008 0.217 0.281** 
(t-1) (0.0284) (0.0181) (0.15) (0.136) 
     
Kyoto Signature  -0.130* -0.150** n.a. n.a. 
(t-1) (0.0762) (0.0698) n.a. n.a. 
     
GDP per Capita (t-
1)  
0.0614*** 0.0609*** 0.0928*** 0.0931*** 
(K$) (0.0139) (0.0118) (0.0226) (0.024) 
     
∆ GDP per Capita  0.147*** 0.104** 0.201*** 0.156** 
(K$) (0.0559) (0.0468) (0.0644) (0.0791) 
     
Trade Openness (t-
1) 
-0.00043 -0.000422 -0.0181*** -0.0173*** 
 (0.000328) (0.000391) (0.00495) (0.0049) 
     
∆ Trade Openness 0.00616*** 0.00153** 0.0329*** 0.0047 
 (0.00183) (0.000759) (0.00751) (0.00418) 
     
Service  (t-1) -0.159 -0.159 0.308 0.0545 
 (0.109) (0.103) (0.592) (0.55) 
     
∆ Service 0.295 0.485* 6.690* 9.485*** 
 (0.32) (0.269) (3.917) (3.451) 
     
Oil Price (t-1) 0.00103 0.000977 0.0119* 0.0122* 
 (0.000832) (0.000595) (0.00611) (0.00653) 
     
∆ Oil Price -0.000371 0.000338 -0.00428 0.000832 
 (0.0013) (0.00088) (0.00926) (0.00925) 
     
OPEC * Trade 
Openness (t-1) 
-0.00103 -0.00159 0.0134*** 0.0107** 
 (0.00165) (0.00153) (0.00446) (0.00422) 
     
OPEC (t-1) 0.169** 0.176** -0.670** -0.581* 
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.34) (0.325) 
     
CO2 per Capita (t-
1) 
-0.0540*** -0.0557*** -0.0830*** -0.0834*** 
 (0.0157) (0.0137) (0.0249) (0.0275) 
     
Constant -0.0317 -0.0453 0.133 0.253 
  (0.0789) (0.0681) (0.53) (0.451) 
Observations 2780 2801 393 394 
R2 0.107 0.103 0.19 0.171 
OLS regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) (in parenthesis). * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3:  Analysis of Carbon Emissions (1970-2004) – Levels 
(select variables only) 
 
Level 
effects on 
CO2 per 
capita 
(1a)   
All  
countries 
(1b)  
All  
countries 
(2a)  
OECD  
countries 
(2b)  
OECD  
countries 
(3a) 
Non-
OECD 
(3b) 
Non-
OECD 
(4a) 
OPEC 
(4b) 
OPEC 
Political 
Capacity  -0.275 -0.524 -7.542** -8.018** 0.093 -0.090 -0.229 -0.683 
(t-1) (0.797) (0.620) (3.585) (3.721) (0.620) (0.499) (2.277) (2.098) 
 
        
Political 
Constraint  -5.192***  5.593  -2.204*  -2.554  
(t-1) (1.777)  (8.441)  (1.157)  (3.566)  
 
        
Democracy 
Level (t-1)  -0.183***  0.180  -0.072***  -0.180* 
  (0.050)  (0.317)  (0.023)  (0.091) 
  
        
FCCC 
Signature -1.044 -0.969 -2.797 -3.333 0.130 0.144 2.614 3.369** 
(t-1) (0.739) (0.626) (5.322) (5.910) (0.526) (0.325) (1.807) (1.631) 
 
        
Kyoto 
Signature -2.857** -3.089*** -1.017 -0.721 -2.407* -2.693** n.a. n.a. 
(t-1) (1.316) (1.089) (5.983) (7.306) (1.411) (1.253)   
  
        
GDP per 
Capita  0.896*** 0.856*** -0.669 -0.661 1.137*** 1.093*** 1.118*** 1.116*** 
(t-1) (K$) (0.237) (0.199) (0.499) (0.492) (0.257) (0.212) (0.272) (0.288) 
 
        
∆ GDP per 
Capita  3.489** 2.298** 25*** 26.577*** 2.722*** 1.867** 2.422*** 1.871** 
(K$) (1.473) (1.165) (4.331) (4.730) (1.035) (0.840) (0.776) (0.948) 
 
        
Trade 
Openness 0.001 0.000 -0.065 -0.066 -0.008 -0.008 -0.218*** -0.207*** 
(t-1) (0.006) (0.007) (0.058) (0.060) (0.006) (0.007) (0.060) (0.059) 
 
        
∆ Trade 
Openness 0.190*** 0.062*** 1.593** 1.721** 0.114*** 0.027** 0.396*** 0.056 
 (0.049) (0.018) (0.635) (0.689) (0.034) (0.014) (0.090) (0.050) 
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Appendix: Data Sources 
 
CO2 per capita:  Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), Version 6.0. 
(Washington, DC: World Resources Institute, 2009). 
 
RPC:  Relative Political Capacity Index. Data from Jacek 
Kugler. ontact information: 
http://www.cgu.edu/pages/477.asp (accessed 15 Nov. 
2008). 
 
PolCon V:  Political Constraints Index 2006 Release (with data to 
2004). Data from Witold Henisz. Available at: 
http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/ 
(accessed 15 Nov. 2008). 
 
Polity IV: Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2007. Available at: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4v2007.xls 
(accessed 14 Feb. 2009). 
 
FCCC signature status:  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: Status of Ratification (as of 22 August 2007), 
UNFCC. Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/ 
convention/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/unf
ccc_conv_rat.pdf (accessed 04 Feb. 2009). 
 
Kyoto Protocol sig, status::  Kyoto Protocol Status of Ratification (as of 14 
January 2009). UNFCCC. Available at: 
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratifi
cation/application/pdf/kp_ratification.pdf  (accessed 
04 Feb. 2009). 
 
Real GDP per capita: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn 
World Table Version 6.2, Center for International 
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the 
University of Pennsylvania, September 2006. 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_fo
rm.php (accessed 15 Nov. 2008). 
 
Trade Openness:  Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn 
World Table Version 6.2, Center for International 
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the 
University of Pennsylvania, September 2006. 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_fo
rm.php (accessed 15 Nov. 2008). 
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Service Sector: GDP and its breakdown at current prices in US 
Dollars, United Nations Statistics Division. Available 
at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnllist.asp 
 
OPEC:  Available at: http://www.opec.org/aboutus/ (accessed 
15 Dec. 2008). 
 
Oil Price:  BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008. 
Available at: 
http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/
globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statisti
cal_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/downl
oads/pdf/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_revie
w_2008.pdf (accessed 04 Feb. 2009). 
 
Population: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn 
World Table Version 6.2, Center for International 
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the 
University of Pennsylvania, September 2006. 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_fo
rm.php (accessed 15 Nov. 2008). 
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